Moving toward multilateral mechanisms for the fuel cycle by Panasyuk,A. et al.
BROOKH
iNl\L BO
BNL-82225-2009-CP
Moving toward multilateral mechallisms for the fuel
cycle
Alexander PanasYUK,l Gleb V~ l2fremov,2 Michael D. Rosenthae
IRussian Federation, 2Russian Federation, 3Brookhaven National Laboratory
INMM 50th Annual Meeting
TUCSOll, Arizona
July 12-16, 200'1
Nonproliferation and National Security Department
Nonproliferation and Safeguards Division
Brookhaven National Laboratory
P.O. Box 5000
Upton, NY 11973-5000
Notice: This manuscript has been authored by employees of Brookhaven Science Associates, LLC under
Contract No. DE-AC02-98CHW886 with the U.S. Department of Energy. The publisher by accepting the
manuscript for publication acknowledges that the United States Govemment retains a non-exclusive, paid-up,
. irrevocable, world-wide license to publish or reproduce the published form of this manuscript, or anow others
to do so, for United States Government purposes. This prepiint is intended for publication in a journal or
proceedings. Since changes may be made before publication. it may not be cited or reproduced without the
author's pennission.
1 Senior Analyst on Safeguards, International Uranium Enrichment Center, Russian Federation
2 Commercial Director, International Uranium Enrichment Center, Russian Federation
. 3 Head, Division of Nonproliferation and Safeguards. Brookhaven National Laboratory, USA
,DISCLAIMER
This repmt was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency the
United States Government Neither States Government nor any
agency thereat nor any their employees, nor any their contractors,
,subcontractors, or their employees, any warranty, express or hnplied. or
assumes any legal liability or responsibility for accuracy, completen.ess, or any
party's use or of such use any infonnation, apparatus,
or process disclosed, or represents that use would not infringe privately owned
rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service
by trade name, trademark, rnanufacturer, or otherwise. does not necessarily
constitute or imply its endorsement~ recornmendation~ or favoring by the United
'States Government or agency thereof or its contractors or subcontractors.
The views and opinions authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or
reflect those of the United St.ates Government or any agency thereof.
Moving toward multilateral mechanisms for the el cycle
, Alexander Panasyuk,l Gleb V~ Efremov,:2 Michael D. Rosenthal3
ABSTRACT: Multilateral mechanislTIS for the fuel cycle are seen as a potentially
important way to create an industrial infrastructure support a renaissance
an.d at the sanle tiIne not to the risk. proliferation.
intern.ational nuclear fuel cycle centers for enrid:nnent can help to provide an assurance
nuclear reduce the individual states pursue
this sensitive technology~which can be used to produce nuclear material directly usable
nuclear weapons. Multinational participation in such mechanisms can also potentially
promote transparency, confidence, and make the implementation
safeguards luore effective or more efficient. At the same tiule, it is important to ensure
there is no dissemination. of sensitive technology.
The Russian Federation has taken a lead role in area by establishing an International
Uranium Enrichment Center (IUEC) for the provision of enrichment services at its
uranium enrichment plant located at the Angarsk Electrolysis Chemical Complex
(AECC). This paper describes how the IUEe is organized., who its members are, and the
steps iliat it has taken both to provide an assured supply of nuclear fuel and to ensure
protection of sensitive technology. It also describes the relationship between the IDEe
and the IAEA and steps that remain to be taken to enhance its assurance of supply.
Using the IDEe as a starting point for discussion, the paper also explores more generally
the ways in which features of such fuel cycle centers with multinational participation can
have an impact on safeguards arrangements, transparency, 'and confidence-building.
Issues include possible lAEA safeguards arrangements or other links to the IAEA that
might be established at such fuel cycle centers~ impact of location in a nuclear weapon
state, and the transition by the IAEA to State Level safeguards approaches.
1. Background
There is widespread support for a future in which the use of nuclear energy is a growing
component of the world ~ s energy production, but in. which, at the same time, the spread
of sensitive nuclear technologies - and thus the risk of proliferation - is minimized. A
key element of achieving these objectives is the development of mechanisms to provide
nuclear fuel to customers at competitive prices and an assurance of supply so robust that
they have no economic or energy security incentives to putsue indigenous enrichment or
reprocessing programs, Multilateral approaches to nuclear fuel cycle are an hnportant
means to create such a mechanism.
Such multilateral approaches have already received considerable review and attention.
For example, in 2004 the IAEA Director General appointed an international group of
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experts to consider their potentiaL i At the Eurasian Economic Community suminit in
January 2006, the President of the Russian Federation, V.V. Putin, made a statementii on
the peaceful use of atomic energy in which he noted the need for the establishluent of a
global nuclear power infrastructure, ensuring equal access to nuclear power for all
interested parties and, at the same time, reliable compliance with the requirements of the
non-proliferation regime. A key of such an infrastructure, he should be the
creation of a system of international centres providing nuclear fuel cycle services,
including enrichment, under the control the The main assurance that
initiative should provide is that a country complying with its non-proliferation
commitments must be sure that, whatever the turn of events~ whatever changes take place
in the international situation, it win receive the services guaranteed to it
More recently, President Obanla, while he was a candidate, issued a Fact Sheet,iii which
addressed the issue of fuel assurances as foHows:
prevent Nuclear Fuel from BecoIning Nuclear Bombs: Barack Obmna win work
with other interested governments to establish a new international nuclear energy
architecture - induding an international nuclear fuel bank, international nuclear fuel
cycle centers, and reliable fuel supply assurances - to meet growing delnands for
nuclear power without contributing to the proliferation. ~f nuclear materials and fuel
production facilities.
The Russian Federation has taken a lead role in establishing an. international nuclear fuel
cycle center for the provision of enrichment services. In particular, it has created an
International Uranium Enridunent Center (IUEe) at its enrichment plant at the Angarsk
Electrolysis Chemical Complex (AECC). In a communication to the IAEA Director
General in June, 2007/v the Russian Federation highlighted important aspects of
international nuclear fuel cycle centers and the lUEC, including;
• Nondiscrimination within the NPT: A global nuclear power infrastructure to ensure
equal access to nuclear power and, at the same time, reliable compliance with the
requirements of the non-proliferation regime.
• IAEA participation: A system of international centerspr~viding nuclear fuel cycle
services, including enrichment, under the control of the IAEA.
• Assurance of supply: A guarantee that for a country complying with its non-
proliferation commitments it will receive the services guaranteed to it regardless of
events or whatever changes take place in the international situation,
• Protection of technology: No transfer to IUEC participants of uranium enrichment
technology or information that constitutes a State secret.
e Safeguards: Making the ruEe eligible for safeguards under Russia's voluntary offer
safeguards agreement
• Uranium reserve: setting aside a specific quantity of enriched uranium product as a
deposit for a guaranteed stockpile at the IDEe in a quantity of up to 1-2 full reactor
loads; and a regulatory basis such that the shipment of material out of the country at the
request of the Agency is guaranteed.
e Advisory body: establishment of ajoint advisory committee with the presumption that
the IAEA will be represented in the committee.
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noted. above, the objectives of the
An in aU, the l1JEC contains elements that Inany observers have considered important for
multilateral nuclear arrangements: accessibility, assurance of supply when there is
compliance with nonproliferation commitlnents, safeguards, and a uranium reserve
to provide a physical '''fuel bank" to underscore the assurance of supply.
2. Status oftile IUEC
In accordance with the statement of President
Initiative are to:
* prevent an uncontrolled proliferation of sensitive nuclear technologies that could be
used not only for civil but also for military purposes~
@ increase the role of nuclear energy in provision of global energy assurance;
* develop the global n.uclear energy infrastructure via the establishment of an
international nu.clear fuel cycle centers network; and
• provide non-discriminatory and assured access to products and services of the
nuclear fuel cycle for those states that are currently developing nuclear powero
While the Russian President's Initiative suggested that fOUf types of centers could be
created, uranium enrichment; reprocessing of spent fuel; training of personnel for the
nuClear industry; and developnlent of innovative atomic energy technologies, it wa"
decided to launch first a pilot project to establish the International Uranium Enrichment
Centre (lUEe) on the site of the Angarsk Electrolysis Chemical Complex (hereinafter the
AECC) taking into account the developed infrastructure there. This was announced in
September 2006 by Rosatom at the 50th session of the IAEA General Conference.
The IDEe was established in partnership with the Republic of Kazakhstan as a joint-
stock company. This structure ensures the ruBe's fin.ancial independence from the State
budgets of the participants. The main function of the IUEe is to provide its participating
companies with guaranteed access to uraniunl enrichment capabilities. At the same time,
the Russian side win not transfer to IUEe participants the sensitive uranium enrichment
technology or classified infonnation that constitutes a State secret.
In addition, on 27 December, 2007, the Government of the Russian Federation took the
decision to inclu.de the TIJEC on the list of Russian facilities that could be subject to the
IAEA Safeguards in the framework of the Safeguards Agreement between Russian
Federation and the IAEA - INFCIRC/327. The Russian Governrnent decided in case
of IAEA safeguards application to IUEe nuclear material, the costs of safeguards would
be covered by the Russian Federation, As of early 2009, arrangements to put IUEe
nuclear material under IAEA safeguards were under negotiation.
2.2 Intergovernmental Agreement
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fun cornpliance their NPT
become shareholders of
The Agreemen.t between the Govenuncnts of the Russian Federation and the Republic of
Kazakhstan about the establishment of the IUEe sets forth the fundamental basis for its
goal, structure, and governance, including:
@ Main goals and terms for the IUEe operations;
@ Executive bodies and authorized companies~
I.e POrol of incorporation and location of the
@ Basic to member-countries
obligations). nO!llinated companies
IDEe;
@ Provision that there be no access by foreign shareholders to the Russian uranium
enrichment technology and classified information;
~ Application of IAEA safeguards to ITJEC nuclear materials;
@ IAEA participation in the work of IDEe' Joint Consultative Comnlission
established for the effective implementat.ion of the objectives of the Agreement As
may be agreed with the IAEA, the representative froul th.e IAEA lnay participat.e in
the work of the Commission being entitled to the consultative capacit.y.
2.3, The structure ofthe lUEe
The structure on foundation of the IDEe is shown in Figure 1.
The initial Intergovernmental Agreement between Russia and Kazakhstan entered into
force in August, 2007. It nominated JSC TENEX and' JSC "NAC Kazatomprom as
founders of the IUEC. It was then also established in August 2007 in the form of a Joint.-
Stock Company (JSC). The initial share distribution was: JSC TENEX - 90% and JSC
"'NAC Kazatomprom" - 10~;. The IUEC then concluded service contracts with the
AECC.
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2.4 The IVEC basic principles
Article 3 of the Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of
Kazakhstan establishes the main task of the IUEC as securing assured access to the
uranium enrichment capacities of the AECC for organizations-participants of the Center
from countries that do not develop their own uranium enrichnlent capacities.
The IDEC basic principles are:
e Non-discrimination, Le. equalluclnbership terms for all States concerned;
® Assured access of the IUEe melnber-States to enriched uranium product (BUP)
and/or SWU;
InClnber-countries through guaranteed access to goods
will exceed benefits that obtained by
on their own fuel cycle facilities.
® The IUEC operation is based on the existing market relations~
I) Transparency of the IUEe operation through the application of IAEA safeguards to
nuclear material under the ownership of the Center;
e No access of foreign members to the Russian uraniunl enrichrnent technology and
classified information;
@ Advantages of IUEe to
and services
developing and
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2.5 Background ofthe IUEC foundation
Subsequently Iueulbership the IUEe has grown. In November~ 2007 the Republic of
Annenia nominated the JSC "Armenian NPP" to join. On 24 June, 2008 the Republic of
Ukraine made a decision to nominate the concern "Nuclear Fuel of Ukraine" to join the
IUEe.
Maiultegl,ance of {j guaranteed physical reserve a,,, a second direction of the {VEe
activity
In response to the IAEA Director Generar s initiatives on multilateral approaches to the
nudear fuel cycle and on assurance of fuel supply mechanisms, the Government of the
Russian Federation has proposed to establish a guaranteed physical reserve of 120 tones
of LEU. This win be in. the form of UF6 with an enrichment level ranging from 2.0% to
4.95% and win be stored at the IDEC under Agency safeguards for the use of IAEA
Member States experiencing a disruption of LEU supply. The costs of safeguards win be
covered by Russia.
This LEU reserve would constitute a practical application of the provisions of Article IX
of the Statute of the IAEA on the supply of nuclear material. The LEU reserve at the
IDEC would be intended to serve as a guaranteed supply to supplement the existing
cOJTill1ercial market in nuclear fuel and as a protection of interested Member States
against possible disruptions of LEU supplies.
For a Consmner State to receive nuclear material from this reserve, the IABA would have
to draw a conclusion that all nuclear material had been accounted for; that there was no
indication of diversion of declared nuclear material; and that there would not be any
safeguards implementation issues concerning the State under consideration by the IAEA
Board of Governors. The LEU would be made available to any non-nuclear-weapon State
member of the IAEA that has an effective safeguards agreement with the IAEA requiring
the application of safeguards on all of its peaceful nuclear activities.
Inlportant features of the LEU Reserve at the lUEC include:v
.. Non-discriminatory and inclusive nature - it would be available to aU IAEA
Member States meeting the above-lnentioned attributes;
e Non~restdctive - there would be no requirement for interested IAEA Member
States, explicit or implicit~ to forgo any rights, induding rights to develop a
country's national fuel cycle capabilities;
• No cost to the IAEA - there would be no financial burden on the !AEA or its
Member States, since all start-up~ storage, maintenance, safeguards and other costs
would be covered by Russia; the cost of any LEU supplied from the reserve would
be covered by the Consumer State at the time of delivery;
till NOD 6 exdusive - it would not conflict with or hinder the establishment or operation
of any other elements of assurance of supply mechanisms;
• Non-disrnptive - the LEU reserve would not undermine the commercial nuclear
fuel market; the quantity of LEU delivered would be relatively small compared to
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the overall market volurne~ and the actual rnarket spot price would be charged to
the Consumer State;
@ No delays - the Goverrnnent of Russian Federation in its agreement with
IAEA on establishing an physical reserve would con.firm that necessary
authorizations licenses would the could be
exported delay for to a Consurner State;
@ Pro-cooperative - it would work in synergy and harmony various initiatives
on nuclear assurances, current to a menu
other fuel assurance options that may be agreed upon by !AEA States,
such as for example the IAEA LEU bank proposed by the Nuclear Threat Initiative,
as well as the multilateral enrichment project (!viESP) proposed by
Germany;
@ Prolonged - it would be established for an indefinite period replenishment
the supply of LEU is envisaged;
@ Promotional - it would facilitate the continu.ing and future use of nudear energy
for electricity production~ and support its beneficial expansion to help nleet
increasing global energy needs.
A flow chart of establishment and utilization of a Reserve of LEU for the Supply of LEU
to the IABA for its Member States is shown in Figure 2.
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2.7 Membership ofthe lUEe
At the 52nd session the IAEA General Conference held in Vienna September 2008
Sergey Kirienko in Statemenei said that, " Mernbership the Centre was open to
oth~r countries, without any political conditions ,'!
A c01uplete structure of the is shown Figure 39
~ Authorized Companies of new nlember-countries can join the IUEe on the basis of
separate Government- to- Government Agrecluents.
e Article 5 of the Agreement on foundation of the IUEe says:
o .....Such participation is carried out based on separate government-to-
government agreements between the Parties hereto and goverrunents of the
third States in the manner prescribed in the Articles of Association of the
Center..."
• As new members join, there is a redistribution of shares in the lDEC chartered
capital that is obtained by reducing JSC TENEX share fraction as follows:
o JSC TENEX - 50% +1 Share
o JSC "NAC KazatolnpromH - 10%,
o New member-countries (aU together) - 40% -1 Share
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Figure 3..
* (Service contract is guaranteed by t[)e Russian Government)
Government of the
Repnblic of
Kazakhstan
The redistribution of shares in the IUEC chartered capital by reducing the JSC TENEX
share fraction after the Republics of Armenia and Ukraine joined the IUEC is shown in
Figure 4..
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3.. 'Multilateral Mechanisms
The IUEe should be seen as part of a growing trend to develop multilateral mechanisms
to underpin growing interest by Inany states in beginning or expanding nuclear power
programs. Such lnechanisms can lend confidence to the ll1arket and create an improved
nuclear nonproliferation environment.vii However, the model adopted for the IDEe is not
necessarily applicable in other circun1stances. For example, the uranium feed purchased
by the IUEC participants may not have associated with it the "label" or "flag" of another
country or countries. Such flags generally carry with them requirements for retransfer
that go beyond the requirenlents of full-scope safeguards and IAEA assurance of a
positive safeguards status, as described above for the IUEe.
Further, each state or group of states desiring to create a multilateral mechanism win
need to define for itself numerous features of it structure and operation, including for
example: its business structure; ground rules for countries to participate; conditions of
supply in routine circumstances and when a supply disruption is alleged; fole(s) of IAEA
other than safeguards; protection of sensitive technology; and means to promote
transparency.
Nonetheless, using the IDEe as a starting point, it is worth exploring the ways in which
features of nuclear fuel cycle centers with multinational participation can have an impact
on transparency, confidence-building, and safeguards arrangem.ents. Issues include
possible IAEA safeguards arrangements or other links to the IAEA that might be
established at such fuel cycle centers, impact of location in a nuclear weapon state, and
the transition. by the IAEA to State Level safeguards approaches.
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3.1. Safeguards {lrrangerll,ents
observers that the safeguards arrangements at multinational nuclear
facilities would differ from those employed in a comparable national facility. For
e:xam.ple~ the expert group report cited (INFCIRC/640) suggested that,
respect to MNAs~ safeguards im.plernentation by t.he take account
special positive nature of a multinational nuclear facility," rationale
@ '·Participants, private or be to
transparency and openness through the continuous presence of a lTIultinational
staff; and
@ Flows of materials would be mostly between partners to the MNA.
The Experts suggested "This additional layer of international oversight would be
recognized by the IAEA, possibly allowing thereby a reduction of the safeguards
verification effort." Indeed, if the IAEA were to receive "through the continuous
presence of a multinational staff' additional confidence that the operation of the facility
had been nonnal and correctly and fully reported~ it would be reasonable for the lAEA to
take this into account, for example, by reducing the detection probabilities that it used for
planning inspections.
The Experts also cited the SAGSI May 2004 report which ~'noted that a large number of
facilities receive nuclear materials from, and send nuclear materials to, other States, and
also that Inany facilities employ multinational staff whose activities are interrelated with
those of other States." They noted that, "SAGSI confirmed that the IAEA should give
appropriate recognition to international interdependence under the so called 'State level
approach,' an approach that would include consideration of State specific factors such as
the level of cooperation with the IAEA on safeguards implementation in the State,
including consideration of openness and transparency; and the presence of a supportive
and effective State System of Accounting for and Control (SSAC) of nuclear material."
This context, the Experts observed, is relevant for MNA joint facilities.
It would be for the IAEA to detennine whether its confidence was enhanced by the nature
of the MNA. At issue would be the extent of the information, its credibnity~ and how the
IAEA would take it into account in nl0difying its safeguards approach. IAEA
participation in an advisory board for the fuel cycle center, as is provided for in the
IUEe, might benefit this process. Consideration might also be given to including lAEA
inspectors in the "multinational staff' envisioned by the Experts. Inspectors could play
key roles in carrying out or supervising the plant's nuclear material accountancy system.
Depending on the tasks that they performed, this direct participation in the operation of
the plant might be the best way to enh.ance the confidence of the IAEA.viii Such
participation would, undoubtedly, raise legal issues that would have to be resolved. In
ad~ition, regardless of the staff, care would have to be taken to proteot sensitive
technology.
3.2. State Level Approach
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The IAEA is transfOffiling its safeguards system frOUl a facility-by-facility approach to a
State Level Approach (SLA). In the latter, it views the state as a whole~ takes into
account aU available information, and uses a careful and structured analysis of aspects
of an individual NNWS's nuclear activities and nuclear weapon materials and
technologies acquisition paths available to it is clnhodied the State
Report (SER). The SLA is based on the state-specific set of objectives that need to be
addressed in to detennine relative and focus of safeguards activities
needed for the Agency to draw soundly-based safeguards conclusions. The SL,A is used
both to draw safeguards conclusions and to plan inspections.
~ether and how to take into account for these purposes the presence a multinational
facility in a given State is an open question. It may depend on whether the facility was in
an "extraterritorial enclave," a possibility suggested in a proposal from Germany. In this
case, it would not appear to have a direct bearing on the evaluation of the host state,
although the willingness of the state to host the facility co~ld be factored in.
In general, elements that are factored into a State level evaluation include the quality of
the SSAC; IAEA's ability to employ safeguards measures such as unattended and reinote
monitoring or short-notice random inspections (SNRI; and availability of information
about the state's nuclear activities. As discussed above, the multinational facility should
contribute to the overall transparency of the host State's nuclear activities.
3.3. SLA in a NWS
The fact that the IDEe is in a nuclear weapon state (NWS) provokes the general question
of whether there is an applicable state level approach for a NWS, recognizing that State
Level Approaches are intended to be applied to NNWS where both a comprehensive
safeguards agreement and an Additional Protocol are in force. There they fonn the basis
for. drawing conclusions about the absence of diversion from declared nuclear matedal
and of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the State as a whole.
On the other hand, when safeguards are applied in NWS, the safeguards conclusion is
narrower -whether or not nuclear material has been rernoved from a facility other than in
accordan.ce with the temls of the relevant agreenlent. For obvious reasons, there is not, in
these cases, any objective of detecting diversion to nuclear weapons.
The technical objective of safeguards is also different in NWS than in NNWS, in
particular by being facility specific. Russia's voluntary offer safeguards agreement is
typical when it states that the objective of safeguards is· the timely detection. of the
withdrawal of nuclear material from facilities at which safeguards are being applied
except in accordance with the terms of the agreement. Conclusions are not, and cannot,
be drawn at the State level about the absence of undeclared nuclear activities.
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It should be emphasized that developing a SLA for NWS safeguards inlplelnentation has
not been pursued to date. In addition, safeguards implementation at reprocessing and
enrichlnent plants has not been adapted under integrated safeguards arrangeluents.ix
Except for plant specific adaptations, to date IAEA has sought to ensure uniform
inlplementation of safeguards at enrichment and reprocessing facilities.
the objectives purposes of safeguards differ, to the extent that safeguards are
O:>""'~",,!1C'r! at a multinational facility in aNWS~ are ways that a NWS SLA be
developed. These ways would be additional to whatever consideration would flow froIn
the facility being a multinational enterprise. One way is to take into account in the
structured analysis that is referred to above the fact of an existing nuclear weapon
program in establishing safeguards priorities. The fact of these programs implies a lack
of incentive to "divert" nuclear nlaterial frotTI a safeguarded uranium enridllnent facility
or to produce excess LEU or REU clandestinely. One way to take this into account
would be to use less stringent goals for the inspection parameters of detection probability,
timeliness of detection, or significant quantity. For example, a higher SQ might be
considered as more appropriate.
One could also review the relevance or the weighting of the three IAEA objectives for
enrjchment plant safeguards:
• diversion of significant quantities of declared material
• excess production of LEU from undeclared feed
• production of enriched uraniufi1 with a greater than declared enrichment~
particularly HEU.
Of these, the second might be considered less pertinent than the others for a NWS where
it operated at the same time an unsafeguarded uranium enrichment facility that was
already producing LEU from "undeclared feed" - undeclared because the plant was not
subject to safeguards. In the SaIne vein, the fust objective might be considered less
peltinent than the third. both because the Inaterial would need further processing to
manufacture a nuclear weapon and· because of the presence of unsafeguarded stocks of
similar lnaterial.
An alternative way is to adjust safeguards implementation or intensity would be to use
factors that were seen as indicators of the commitment of the NWS to fulfin its NPT
Article VI obligations. For example, one could take onto account factors such as:
o the status of the nuclear weapon stockpile in a NWS and whether it was growing,
was static, or was being reduced; and .
• whether nuclear material from nuclear weapons was being transferred to peaceful
uses - downblending of BED or use Pu in reactor fuel.
In circumstances where it seemed dear that nuclear weapon stockpiles were diminishing
or where nuclear weapon material was being converted to civil use~ the priority attached
to the third objective - production of BEU - might be reduced.
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4. ('1oncluding remarks
There is considerable interest in the use international or ll1tIltinatio1.1al nuclear
cycle centers to help sthnulate the growth of nuclear en.ergy as a share of global
electricity prod.uction. However this must be done in a fashion promotes important
nuclear nonproliferation objectives? especially by eliminat~ng the need states to
develop own sensitive nuclear technologies through assured access to necessary
JlJlt.!~""Jl"-"u.~ ruaterial. dissemination sensitive uranimn e1.1richntcnt technology by the
A.Q. Khan clandestine network highlights to importance of this objective.
The Russian Federation has already established one such center is stnlctured to
provide assured access through the cOlnbination of a joint stock company that is
independent of state budgets; has access to enrichment "services via contract with the
AECC; and win have, further, a significant reserve of enriched unmim.n that is to be
made available in case of a supply disruption. A key is that assured access is available
to countries that do not develop their own uraniunl enrichlnent capacities.
Still, there are aspects of the IDEe that relnain to be completed, especially, perhaps, the
finalization of arrangement with the IAEA providing for the application of safeguards to
IUEe nuclear material.
The IUEe is unique, but it calls attention to a number of issues that arise in the context of
a multinational fuel cycle center, including some that apply to all such centers and some
that apply to centers in a NWS.
It is clear that there remains considerable raonl for further developnlent of these issues.
i See INFCIRC/640, 22 February 2005, Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Expert Group
Report submitted to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency
ii INFCIRCn08, 8 June 2007, Communication received from the Resident Representative of the Russian
Federation to the IAEA on the Establishment, Structure and Operation of the International Uranium
Enrichment Centre
iii F~ct Sheet: Obama's New Plan to Confront 21 st Century Threats. Chicago, IL IJuly 16, 2008 at
http://www.barackobama.com/2008/071l6!faccsheet_obamas_new__pIau_to.php
iv See INFCIRCI708), 8 June 2007, letter from the Permanent Mission of Russia on the Establishment,
Structure and Operation ofthe international Uranium Enrichment Centre (which contained an attachment
on Establishment, structure and operation of the International Uranium Enrichment Centre.
v Development of the Russian Federation Initiative to Establish a Reserve of Low Enriched Uranium (LEU)
for the Supply of LEU to the IAEA for its Member States, GOV/INP/2009fl, 23 February 2009, Attachment,
PageS.
vi lAEA General Conference GC(52)/OR.1, Record of the First Meeting, Austria Center, Vienna. Monday,
29 September 2008, Hems: 152-187.
vii Not aU observers endorse the idea that multinational nuclear arrangements are necessarily positive. In at
least one case, a participant in a multinational facility (Iran) was reused access to nuclear material for
reasons other than strictly related to nuclear nonproliferation.
viii If the MNA reimbursed the IAEA for the work performed by IAEA staff, the total cost to the lAEA
would be reduced.
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ix According to the IAEA's "Research and Development Programme for Nuclear Verification 2006-207,"
integrated safeguards approaches for uranium enrichment faciHties, MOX facilities, reprocessing plants,
and HEU storage facilities remained to he and approved,"
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